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how the plans affect the after-tax return on investments
and the user cost of capital. The most important criterion
in evaluating the proposals is tax neutrality. This article
deals only with those incentives on saving- and invest-
ment decisions that originate in the tax system. Other fac-
tors, such as the risk premium, are ignored.1
Methodology
The forms of savings and investments 
This paper applies the methodology developed by King
and Fullerton (KF) (1984) and extends this methodology
in various ways. In particular, the calculations are not
restricted to investments by corporations but also include
investments by unincorporated businesses (the self-
employed) and investments in owner-occupied dwellings.
Moreover, unlike KF , we include investments in intangi-
ble assets, such as research and development, marketing
and company training. These expenditures typically ben-
efit from immediate expensing. We distinguish six types
of households, depending on their investment stategy2
and their marginal income- and wealth tax rates. Table 1
contains the relevant distinctions.
Abstract
One of the options in the Dutch cabinet white paper
‘Taxation in the 21st century’ is to replace the personal
income tax on interest and dividend incomes and
the wealth tax on bonds and shares by a schedular tax
on a presumptive return to personal wealth. This arti-
cle analyzes how these reform proposals affect tax dis-
tortions, employing the methodology developed by
King and Fullerton. The proposed reform eliminates
some forms of tax arbitrage. At the same time, the tax
disadvantage of equity at the corporate level is no
longer offset by the tax advantage of the exempt cap-
ital gain at the personal level. This provides a stronger
tax incentive for corporations to finance their invest-
ments with debt. At a 25%-rate on a presumptive return
of 4%, also individuals who invest in an unincorpo-
rated business or owner-occupied housing will find it
more attractive to use  debt rather than equity.
Samenvatting
Eén van de opties in de nota van het demissionaire
kabinet ‘Belastingen in de 21e eeuw’ is het vervangen
van de synthetische inkomstenbelasting op rente- en
dividendinkomsten door een forfartaire vermogens-
rendementsheffing. Dit artikel analyseert hoe deze her-
vormingsvoorstellen belastingdistorties beïnvloeden.
Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van de methodologie
die is ontwikkeld door King en Fullerton. De belas-
tingvoorstellen blijken een eind te maken aan som-
mige vormen van belastingarbitrage. Tegelijkertijd
creëert het nieuwe stelsel bepaalde distorties. Zo wordt
bijvoorbeeld het fiscale nadeel van eigen vermogen
op vennootsschapsniveau niet langer gecompenseerd
door het fiscale voordeel van onbelaste vermogens-
groei op particulier niveau. Dit bevordert schuldfi-
nanciering bij vennootschappen. Bij een 25%-tarief
over een forfartair rendement van 4% wordt finan-
ciering met vreemd vermogen ook aantrekkelijker voor
particulieren met een eigen bedrijf of een eigen woning.
Introduction
An important component of the recent plans of the Dutch
cabinet to reform the Dutch tax system is the proposed
modification of the taxation of capital. This paper explores
how these plans affect effective tax wedges on saving and
investment. It distinguishes between various forms of sav-
ing and investment and covers the entire tax wedge
between the pre-tax and after-tax returns. We focus on
Table 1 Relevant distinctions
Assets Legal form Source of finance Ownership








Buildings Unincorporated  Equity (for cor- Tax-exempt 
businesses (self- porations to be  institutions
employed) divided in new share 




An outline of the methodology
Like KF , we focus on marginal investments. The taxation
of marginal projects offers the best indication of the impact
of the tax system on saving and investment incentives.
Our methodology, which KF call the fixed-r approach, is
based on two further major assumptions, namely, first,
a fixed and exogenous real interest rate and, second, arbi-
trage at the level of the saver (i.e. the capital supplier).
Figure 1 summarizes the methodology, which is explained
in the rest of this subsection.
* For more information, contact Lans Bovenberg (KUB e-mail: a.l.boven-
berg@kub.nl) or Harry ter Rele (tel. +31-70-338 34 58; e-mail: hjmtr@cpb.nl).26
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A fixed real interest rate
The first main assumption is that the real interest rate in
the small and open Dutch economy is fully determined by
the international capital market. Accordingly, the real inter-
est rate on all interest bearing assets and liabilities is fixed
and is thus not affected by the Dutch tax system. The cal-
culations in this paper assume a real interest rate (r) of
4% and an inflation rate of 2%. The nominal interest rate
is thus 6%.
For debt financed investments, the required pre-tax real
rate of return on a marginal project (p) must equal its tax-
inclusive financing costs. This corresponds to the cost of
capital, which in this paper excludes depreciation. The fixed-
r assumption implies that the cost of capital depends on
the exogenous real interest rate, the marginal tax rate of
the borrower, and the type of asset (because tax depreci-
ation and other allowances can differ among assets). The
taxation of Dutch capital suppliers does not affect the cost
of capital because the interest rate is fixed internationally.
Interest payments are in principle tax deductible. The
legal form determines the tax rate at which these interest
payments can be deducted. In case of corporate invest-
ments, this rate is the corporate tax rate (35%). In case of
investments by the self-employed or in owner-occupied
dwellings, it is the marginal personal income tax rate of
the borrower. This tax rate would not affect the cost of cap-
ital if inflation would be zero and tax depreciation would
equal economic depreciation. In that case, the cost of cap-
ital would correspond to the real interest rate. However, in
the presence of inflation, the deductibility of nominal (rather
than real) interest payments implies a subsidy for the bor-
rower so that the cost of capital is below the real interest
rate. This subsidy increases with inflation and with the tax
rate at which nominal interest payments can be deducted.
Another factor that causes the cost of capital to deviate
from the real interest rate is a difference between tax depre-
ciation and economic depreciation. Tax laws generally allow
assets to be depreciated at a rate that is faster than eco-
nomic depreciation. This raises the present value of the pro-
ject and pushes the cost of capital below the real interest
rate. Other tax allowances increase this effective subsidy
further. However, tax depreciation allowances are gener-
ally defined in nominal terms, causing inflation to erode
their real present value. This raises the cost of capital.
The small-economy assumption of a fixed real interest
rate implies also that the after- tax real rate of return (s)
on interest bearing assets depends solely on the tax sta-
tus of the saver. In the present tax system, households
pay income- and wealth taxes on their savings. In most
cases, therefore, the after-tax yield is lower than the inter-
est rate. This is not the case, however, if household sav-
ings occur through tax exempt institutions, such as pen-
sion funds and insurance companies.
Arbitrage by the saver
The second main assumption underlying our analysis is
that the saver (i.e. households and tax exempt institutions)
requires an after-tax real rate of return (s) on equity that
equals that on a debt claim. Each saver thus earns the same
after-tax yield on all investments. From this net yield and
the taxation of equity financed investments, we derive the
required pre-tax real return for equity financed investments.
This cost of capital for equity financed investments
depends not only on the legal form in which the invest-
ment takes place but also on the tax treatment of the owner
(i.e. the capital supplier). This contrasts with the case of
debt financed investments where the pre-tax yield, as out-
lined above, does not depend on the taxation of the sup-
plier of debt. The fact that the pre-tax yield on debt financed
investments does not depend on the tax treatment of
domestic suppliers of debt is due to the small economy
assumption that the real interest rate is determined on
the international capital market. This assumption implies
that foreign investors are effectively the marginal suppli-
ers of debt. The international capital market for equity,
however, is less internationally integrated because equity
financed investments require more knowledge of local
circumstances. Hence, the cost of equity capital for local
Dutch firms may depend on the tax treatment of Dutch
shareholders. This is especially so for small corporations,
which typically do not have easy access to the interna-
tional capital market. The easier shares are traded inter-
nationally, however, the less the cost of equity capital
depends on the tax treatment of Dutch shareholders.
Shares of large corporations are traded internationally.
The return requirements on equity, therefore, depend to
only a very limited extent on the tax treatment and return
requirements of domestic shareholders; changes in the
Dutch tax treatments of domestic shareholders result in
Figure 1 The basic methodology










(a): depends on the tax treatment of the saver
(b): depends on the tax treament of the borrower and the
asset involved
(c): involves an equality due to arbitrage
(d): depends on the tax treatment of the saver, the source of
finance and the asset involved
(c)27
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Dutch shares being traded between domestic and foreign
investors. 
The present tax system
Real after-tax returns
The marginal tax wedge of the supplier of capital is the
difference between the real interest rate and the real after-
tax return s for the investor (see table 3). This marginal tax
wedge depends on the marginal rates at which the investor
is taxed under the personal income and wealth taxes. The
real after-tax return for a traditionally investing household
(i.e. a household investing in a debt claim) facing high
marginal tax rates can be even negative, because the
income tax taxes nominal returns (at a marginal rate of
60%, the income tax reduces the real net return by 3.6%-
points (or 60% of 6%)). The wealth tax reduces the after-
tax return further by 0.7%-point if household wealth
exceeds the exemption for the wealth tax. By assumption,
equity investments yield the same after-tax return at the
margin.
Innovative investors can reduce the tax burden by let-
ting interest income accumulate in a so-called capital
growth fund in which they hold shares. The interest income
accruing to these funds results in a capital gain for the
household. This capital gain is exempt from personal
income tax. The capital growth funds, however, are sub-
ject to corporate income tax. In this way, the marginal tax
burden is reduced from the personal income tax rates (the
top rate is 60%) to the corporate income tax rate of 35%. 
Table 2 illustrates the difference in after-tax returns between
direct household savings and tax-exempt forms of sav-
ing. The tax-exempt forms yield a return that equals the
real interest rate (column 4).
Debt-financed investments
Table 3 (last column) shows the cost of capital for debt
financed investments. It indicates that the cost of capital
is lower than the assumed real interest rate of 4%. The rea-
sons for this associated implicit subsidy are: first, nomi-
nal (as opposed to real) deductibility of interest payments;
second, accelerated tax depreciation (relative to economic
depreciation); and, third, an additional tax allowance on
account of some immediate expensing of investment.
The cost of capital for debt financed investments of the
self-employed are lower than those of corporations for
two reasons. First, the self-employed generally benefit to
a greater extent from immediate expensing because this
tax benefit is aimed at enhancing small investments.
Second, the benefit of accelerated depreciation and of
nominal deductibility of interest payments rises with the
tax rate against which these allowances can be deducted.
The relevant tax rate for the self-employed (the marginal
personal income tax rate) exceeds that of corporations
(the corporate tax rate).
Table 3 shows that the cost of capital is below the real
interest rate also for debt financed investments in owner-
occupied dwellings. The reasons for this are twofold. The
first is that nominal interest payments are fully deductible
for income tax purposes whereas the taxed imputed rent
(1.25% of the value of the property) is generally substan-
tially lower. The second reason is that owner-occupied
dwellings are treated favorably under the wealth tax as
they are valued at only 60% of their market value, while
mortgage debt is fully deductible for the purpose of the
wealth tax. Owner-occupiers face an additional tax in
the form of a local property tax, which averages 0.3% of
the value of the property.
Equity-financed investments
Table 3 contains the required real pre-tax returns also
for equity financed investments. Traditional investors set-
tle for a relatively low pre-tax return on investments of
corporations with retained earnings. If their marginal per-
sonal income tax rate is 60%, the required return on
retained earnings is only 1.1%. The reason for these low
required returns is that an alternative investment, a debt
claim yielding a nominal interest rate of 6%, is subject to
a high personal income tax rate of 60%. Retained earn-
ings, however, which are taxed under corporation tax,
yield a capital gain. This capital gain is not taxed at the
level of the individual shareholder. 
Table 2 Real after-tax returns of households under the present tax system
Households  Tax exempt saving




1.8/1.9 1.2/1.5 – 0.3/1.2 4.0
a The low, average and high marginal income tax rates are, respectively 36.4%, 45% and 60%. The wealth tax rates for low, average and high are 
respectively 0%, 0.4% and 0.7%.28
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If the personal income tax rate of the marginal investor
exceeds the corporate tax rate, the cost of capital of retained
earnings is below that of debt. On the one hand, the return
on retained earnings is taxed at the corporate level at
the corporate tax rate while interest payments are
deductible. On the other hand, unlike the return on debt,
retained earnings are effectively exempt from personal
income tax because of the absence of a capital gains
tax. By retaining earnings within the corporation, the
household can thus reduce the tax rate on its savings from
the marginal personal income tax rate to the corporate
tax rate.
The higher the personal income tax rate of the investor
is, the larger is the tax advantage of retained earnings.
Pension funds and life insurance companies require a
higher return on profits retained by corporations than on
debt because these institutions do not pay any personal
income taxes on alternative investments. 
The innovative investor who lets interest income accu-
mulate in a capital growth fund reduces the taxation of
debt financed investments to the corporate income tax.
For this innovative investor, therefore, the required yield
on debt equals that on retained earnings. 
The second and third columns of Table 3 show the rel-
evance of the distinction between retained earnings and
new share issues for household investments in corpora-
tions. Investments financed with retained earnings fea-
ture a lower cost of capital than investments financed with
new equity. This reflects the lower initial after-tax cost of
the investment to the saver. In case of retained earnings,
the initial cost amounts to the net dividends foregone.
This is lower than the investment because dividends are
subject to personal income tax. Investments with new
shares require a higher return because the initial cost to
the saver corresponds to the invested amount.
The lower costs of retained earnings imply that the cost
of capital for equity of mature firms that generate suffi-
cient retained earnings are relatively low compared to
that of young, fast growing firms that require external
equity to finance their investments. This hampers the trans-
fer of capital between old and new firms and thereby the
dynamics of the capital market.
A comparison between the second and third columns
shows that the difference in return requirements between
new shares and retained earnings is largest for investors
featuring a high marginal rate of personal income tax. For
these shareholders, the personal income tax on dividends
weighs most heavily.
Tax-exempt institutions require almost the same yield on
both forms of equity-investment because the asymmetry in
personal taxation due to personal income taxes on dividends
plays no role here. The slightly higher cost of new share
issues is due to a minor tax on acquiring new capital. 
The distinction between external and internal equity is
not relevant for the self-employed and owner-occupied
housing. Table 3 reveals that the present tax system hardly
impacts the way a traditional investor finances a marginal
investment in owner-occupied housing. The reason is that
the after-tax financing costs of debt are close to the after-
tax return on an alternative investment of the equity (on
the (international) capital market); the income tax paid
can typically be deducted at the same tax rate as the rate
at which the interest on an alternative investment is taxed. 
For the self-employed, an equity financed investment is
slightly more attractive than is a debt financed investment.
This is due to the low rate of wealth taxation on equity
of proprietorships compared to the tax on personal wealth
outside the company.
The required return on owner-occupied housing and
for the self-employed falls with higher rates of income
Table 3 Cost of capital under present tax systemb
Equitya of which: Debt
new retained
shares earnings
Traditional investor facing average marginal tax ratesc in %
Corporations 2.9 6.1 2.6 3.0
Unincorporated businesses 2.2 - - 2.2
Owner-occupied dwellings 2.0 - - 2.0
Traditional investor facing high marginal tax ratesc
Corporations 1.6 6.1 1.1 3.0
Unincorporated businesses 0.6 - - 1.4
Owner-occupied dwellings 1.2 - - 1.2
Innovative investor facing high marginal tax ratesc
Corporations 3.3 6.1 3.0 3.0
Unincorporated businesses 3.1 - - 1.4
Owner-occupied dwellings 2.7 - - 1.2
Tax exempt institution
Corporations 5.9 6.1 5.9 3.0
a The investments of corporations that are financed with equity are assumed to consist of 90% retained earnings and 10% new shares. 
b The assets consist of a) machinery and equipment b) buildings, and c) intangible assets. The weights of these three categories are derived from CPB
(1996) and are respectively 47%, 31% and 22%. 
c The average and high marginal income tax rates are respectively 45% and 60%. The wealth tax rates for average and high are respectively 0.4% and
0.7%.29
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and wealth tax because the advantage of tax allowances
is more substantial for individuals subject to high mar-
ginal tax rates.3
Differences between assets
Table 4 compares the specific taxation of various assets.
Intangible assets are taxed favorably relative to machin-
ery and buildings because of immediate expensing.
Buildings require a slightly higher return due to a prop-
erty tax on buildings at the company level. 
Tax arbitrage
The difference between the required return by traditional
investors on retained earnings and the real interest rate
on the capital market measures the loss of tax revenue
due to tax arbitrage. Individuals earning high labor incomes
can borrow and deduct the nominal interest expenses at
the top personal tax rate of 60% and invest the borrowed
funds in shares of which the returns are not subject to per-
sonal income taxation (if the firm retains its earnings). The
(lower) 35% corporate tax rate on retained earnings only
partially makes up for this effect.
In the absence of external effects, this gap between the
cost of capital on retained earnings and the real interest
rate measures the welfare loss due to these arbitrage trans-
actions; the benefits to society of these investments (i.e.
the pre-tax rate of return) falls short of its cost to society
(i.e. the real interest rate on the international capital 
market). 
The government white paper  
The most important proposals in the cabinet white paper
with regard to the taxation of capital are the elimination
of the wealth tax and the introduction of a schedular income
tax. This schedular approach involves separating indi-
vidual sources of income into three boxes, which are taxed
separately. 
Box I covers labor income, pension benefits and annu-
ities, income of the self-employed, and income from owner-
occupied housing. The sum of these forms of income is
taxed at progressive rates. Most tax rates are slightly lower
than under the present system due to a change in the
tax mix to indirect taxes and some broadening of the
income tax base.
Box II covers the profits of manager/shareholders of
corporations.  This category is not discussed in this article.
Individual income from capital that does not qualify for
boxes I and II is placed in Box III. The cabinet proposes to
tax this income at a proportional rate of around 25%. This
rate will be imposed on a presumptive return on the value
of the underlying personal wealth at an annual date of
measurement. The tax base is thus not the income from
capital but household wealth. According to the white paper,
the cabinet is considering a presumptive return of around
4%. The rate of 25% on a presumptive return of 4% cor-
responds to an effective wealth tax of 1%. Some pro-
gressivity is introduced through a tax exemption of 
ƒ 37,500 for singles and ƒ 75,000 for a married couple.
The following calculations assume a tax rate of 25% on
a presumptive return of 4%, as suggested by the cabinet.
The presumptive return will be applied to the value of
assets minus liabilities. Actual costs (including the costs
of financing) are no longer deductible since the presumptive
return is supposed to be a net return.
The effects of the options  
The taxation of savings  
The government plans raise the after-tax yields for most
suppliers of capital (compare table 5 to table 2), especially
for wealthy traditional investors with high personal incomes
and wealth. This is due to a substitution of the wealth tax
and the progressive personal income tax by a propor-
tional rate of 25% (with a relatively small personal exemp-
tion) on a presumptive return of 4%. The schedular approach
that taxes labor income in a box separate from capital
income implies that the after-tax yields of households with
different labor incomes no longer diverge. The higher after-
tax yield from direct household savings implies that the
disparity with the tax-favored forms of savings is reduced. 
Debt-financed investments  
The proposals have little impact on the cost of debt financed
investments (compare the last columns of tables 6 and 3).
The required return rises slightly for the self-employed
and owner-occupied housing due to the somewhat lower
personal income tax rates (in box I) at which the various
allowances can be deducted. In addition, the elimination
of the wealth tax results in a small rise of the cost of cap-
ital for owner occupied housing because this form of invest-
ment no longer benefits from its favorable treatment under
the wealth tax.
Table 4 Cost of capital for separate assetsa




Machinery and equipment 3.0 6.3 2.6 3.1 3.0
Buildings 3.5 6.8 3.1 3.6 3.5
Intangible assets 2.0 4.6 1.7 2.1 2.0
a The calculations assume corporate investments and conventional savers.30
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Investments with retained earnings 
The tax reforms do not affect the required yields of tax
exempt institutions (compare tables 6 and 3) because the
reforms apply to taxes these institutions do not pay, namely
personal income tax and wealth tax.
Individuals who are currently subject to income- and
wealth tax will require a higher pre-tax return on retained
earnings than under the present tax system. The required
return on retained earnings exceeds that on debt for all
investors. The required yield of individual investors on
retained earnings will rise because the tax at the personal
level that affects only the return on debt (the personal
income tax), is substituted by a tax (the presumptive cap-
ital income tax) that taxes both retained earnings (and the
capital gain generated by it) and the return on debt. Thus,
the tax discrimination of equity at the level of the corpo-
ration (in contrast to interest, the normal return on equity
is not deductible for corporate tax purposes) is no longer
offset by a tax advantage at the personal level (i.e. the tax
exemption of capital gains). In contrast to debt, retained
earnings are therefore taxed twice, viz. at the corporate
level by the corporate tax and subsequently at the per-
sonal level on the basis of a presumptive return.
The higher required yield on retained earnings results
in tax discrimination of equity compared to debt. This may
lead to more debt financing by corporations that rely on
resident shareholders for their equity capital. Shares of
firms that rely also on foreign shareholders and tax exempt
institutions for their equity capital will partially be sold to
these investors.
Investments with new shares
The required yield on new shares does not change because
the effect of the lower taxation of the alternative alloca-
tion of the capital (a debt claim) is offset by the  elimina-
tion of the income tax on dividends. Dividends and 
capital gains are both taxed equally by the presumptive
capital income tax. Hence, apart from the capital duty on
paid-in capital, external equity is no longer taxed more
heavily than internal equity. This removes the tax barrier
on the transfer of capital between firms, thereby enhanc-
ing the dynamics of the capital market and an efficient
allocation of capital.
Owner-occupied housing and the self-employed
The proposals raise the costs of equity investments in owner-
occupied housing and by the self-employed. There are two
reasons for this. The first is the elimination of the wealth
tax which removes the tax advantages of the wealth-tax
exemption on business equity for the self-employed and
of the valuation of housing wealth at only 60%.
The second reason is that owner-occupied housing and
the self-employed are taxed in box I whereas the alter-
native investment of the equity (an investment in debt) is
subject to tax to box III. Hence, the costs of debt and equity
are no longer treated symmetrically. The nominal costs of
debt remain deductible at progressive tax rates (in box I).
The alternative investment of the equity capital on the
capital market, in contrast, is taxed at a proportional rate
of only 25% on a presumptive return of 4%.
Financing owner-occupied residences and investments
of self-employed with equity rather than debt is thus
Table 5 Real after-tax returns under cabinet proposals
Households  Life insurance policies
Under tax exemption Averagea In excess of tax exemption
in %
4.0 3.1 3.0 4.0
a 10% of household wealth is assumed to be under the tax exemption at the margin. 
Table 6 Cost of capital under proposals 
Equity of which:  Debt
new retained
shares earnings
With average marginal rates in %
Corporations 5.9 6.1 5.9 3.0
Unincorporated businesses 4.7 – – 2.3
Owner-occupied dwellings 3.5 – – 2.3
With high marginal tax rates
Corporations 5.9 6.1 5.9 3.0
Unincorporated businesses 5.8 – – 1.5
Owner-occupied dwellings 4.0 – – 1.5
Tax exempt institution
Corporations 5.9 6.1 5.9 3.031
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discouraged, as is the case with corporate investments.
Especially households with high incomes face a substantial
incentive to finance investments in owner-occupied hous-
ing and their own firm with debt and to invest their equity
in assets that can be placed in box III. These transactions
result in a loss of tax revenues because taxable income is
shifted from box I to box III (in which the tax rates are lower
and income is taxed at a presumptive return of only 4%).   
Conclusions
The most fundamental proposal in the cabinet white paper
‘Taxation in the 21st century’ is the replacement of the com-
prehensive income tax on interest and dividend and the
wealth tax by a schedular tax on a presumptive return on
wealth. The tax of 25% on a presumptive return of 4%, sug-
gested by the cabinet, implies a tax of 1% on the value of
wealth (in excess of an exemption). This reform increases
the after-tax rate of return on debt claims for many investors,
especially for traditional investors with high incomes from
other sources, and raises the required yields on other invest-
ment options of these investors. Moreover, it reduces the
relative tax advantage of institutional savings.
Unlike the present income tax, which does not tax cap-
ital gains, the proposed tax on the presumptive return on
capital applies the same effective tax rate on interest, div-
idend and capital gains. This eliminates the tax incentive
for investors facing high marginal personal tax rates to
borrow and to invest the money in shares that generate
capital gains. Investors with high labor incomes no longer
have a stronger tax incentive than other investors to invest
in shares rather than debt claims. The equal tax treatment
of dividends and capital gains implies that externally raised
equity of corporations is hardly discriminated any more
relative to retained earnings. This facilitates the transfer
of capital between companies and promotes the dynam-
ics of the capital market.
By treating debt and equity the same at the personal
level, the tax discrimination of equity relative to debt at
the corporate level is intensified because the tax disad-
vantage of equity at the corporate level is no longer com-
pensated by the tax advantage at the personal level (i.e.
the exemption of capital gains). Shares of corporations
that can turn to foreign shareholders and institutional
investors for their equity capital will partially be sold to
these investors.
The same kind of distortion in favor of debt is created
for individuals investing in unincorporated businesses
and owner-occupied housing. They will find it less attrac-
tive to finance their investments with equity if the tax rate
in box III is 25% and the presumptive return is 4%. This is
especially so for those who are subject to a high marginal
tax rate in box I. Hence, labor income will continue to affect
financial decisions. The tax incentive to finance with debt
and invest equity elsewhere originates in the difference
between the tax rate in box I (where actual nominal inter-
est payments, including the inflation premium, are
deductible) and the proportional tax rate in box III (in which
only the presumptive return of 4% is taxed). 
References
CPB, 1996, Immateriële investeringen in Nederland, CPB Working Paper 86.
King, M. and Fullerton, D., 1984, The taxation of income from capital, the
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Ministry of Finance, 1997, Taxation in the 21st century, an exploration (only
in Dutch), Sdu Publishers, The Hague.
Bovenberg, Lans and Rele, Harry ter, 1998, Evaluating the proposals to reform
Dutch capital taxation, CPB research memorandum (forthcoming).
Notes
1 This article is a shorter version of a forthcoming research memorandum
(see Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)), which elaborates on the applied method-
ology and assumptions.
2Two investment strategies are distinguished, namely traditional and inno-
vative strategies. Traditional investors employ a debt claim as their alterna-
tive investment. Innovative investors, in contrast, invest in a so-called cap-
ital growth fund, which transforms interest income into capital gains. For
more details, see the first two paragraphs of the section on the present tax
system.
3 In the case of the owner-occupied housing these allowances are the rel-
atively low imputed rental value, the full nominal (rather than real) deductibil-
ity of interest payments, and the favorable taxation of housing wealth. For
the self-employed, these tax benefits are an immediate expensing allowance,
accelerated depreciation, nominal (rather than real) deductibility of interest
payments, and favorable wealth taxation of small-business equity.